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Introduction: Ideas and Matter
DAVID TRIPPETT
The legacy of idealism has been a guiding doc-
trine for the study of nineteenth-century music,
fromanemphasis onneo-Platonicmusicalworks,
acousmatic voices and intangible forms, to listen-
ing experiences disembodied, ineffable, and
within the scene of what Mark Evan Bonds has
called “music as thought.”1 This special issue
presents a quartet of articles whose subjects
mark a deliberate departure from this legacy.
Collectively, they pose the question of whether
the regimeof idealismhasobscured the emergent
perspective of natural science during the period,
and with it, those of philosophical and scientific
materialism that engaged composers, listeners,
and their art.
To an extent, this approach aligns with a
recent impulse within the humanities, one that
led Michel Serres to declare that “our body-
box, strung tight, is covered head to toe with a
tympanum. We live in . . . sound waves just as
much as in spaces.”2 The same materializing
impulse might be cited in relation to Bernd
Schulz’s claim from 2002 that “sound has
become material within the context of an
expanded concept of sculpture.”3 But for present
purposes, these articles in this collection adopt
a strictly historical approach, seeking out histor-
ical witnesses to the break with idealism rather
than rearticulating recent disciplinary orienta-
tions toward new theories of matter, vibrant or
otherwise.4
1Mark Evan Bonds, Music as Thought: Listening to the
Symphony in the Age of Beethoven (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2006).
2Michel Serres, The Five Senses: A Philosophy of Mingled
Bodies, trans. Margaret Sankey and Peter Cowley
(London: Continuum, 2008), 141.
3Resonanzen: Aspekte der Klangkunst, ed. Bernd Schulz
(Heidelberg: Kehrer Verlag, 2002), 14.
4Here I allude, of course, to Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter:
A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2009).
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Amid the intellectual energy of the Jena
Romantics, at least twowriters asserted an essen-
tial kinship betweenmusical sound and idealism.
“One must accord music the advantage of being
ideal in its essence,” August Schlegel remarked
in 1802. “It purifies the passions of the material
filth that clings to it by representing the passions
in our inner mind without reference to objects,
but only by their form.”5 Such mental purity, a
kind of acoustic hygiene isolated from material
contact, would intrigue later thinkers. Four years
later, Christian Friedrich Michaelis marveled at
the paradoxical condition that sound was sensi-
ble yet invisible, present yet untouchable, occu-
pying space yet ungraspable: “We cannot accept
[sounds] as part of the physical world,” he avers,
“as witnessed by visual and tactile senses.
Sounds are to a certain extent un-physical,
although they originate from bodies in motion;
and just as spiritual things are invisible, so too
are sounds.”6 This association proved appealing
for criticism in the wake of E. T. A. Hoffmann,
and it had stamina. Even by the end of the cen-
tury Busoni could still assert confidently:
“Immateriality is music’s very essence.”7
If we cast a sidelong glance at the Pythagorean
legacy, an entwinement of idealism and sound
becomes traceable in the long history of Greek
thought. And it is perhaps unsurprising that the
arch-idealist George Berkeley, for one, believed
in an unbroken chain between Greek thought
and the immaterialism he espoused in the late
eighteenth century.8 In what Peter Sloterdijk
calls the “great migration of the mind from
Ionia to Jena,” sound and idealism have proven
kin, recalcitrantly so.9 They arguably underpin
the familiar narratives of the early nineteenth
century that chart the rise of musical autonomy;
the separation of musical sound from those of
nature and the urban environment; the crystalli-
zation of the musical work as a metaphysical
reality, with its defining trait the obligation of
Werktreue; the emergence of music as part of
a Kunstreligion that co-opted Christological
imagery to legitimize subjective reaction
(which Kant, notably, had discredited); and all
amid a deepening cult of genius, wherein a cul-
tural attraction to greatness, a need to worship
cultural achievement typified in Thomas
Carlyle’s—gendered—“Universal History . . .
the History of the Great Men” (1840), fed on
idealized histories and, in many cases, venera-
tion of idealized objects.10
Against this legacy of abstraction, the coeval
impulse toward empirical science treated sound
quite separately, as a fact of the physical envi-
ronment, a kind of primitive or raw artifact
emerging from instruments just as light and fire
emerge from the burning of magnesium and
sulphur. Witness the deadpan empiricism that
closed Ernst Chladni’s first dissertation on plate
vibration: “A sound results when an elastic body
produces coincident and audible vibrations. . . .
By tone, we simplymean a sound where we con-
sider only the height or depth, i.e., the greater or
lesser rate of vibrations.”11 Yet the desire to
eschew metaphysical essences in favor of what
can be verified by the senses was never entirely
distinguished from idealism. Knowledge (within
the natural sciences, at least) needed the poten-
tial of being certain; this meant that only a sci-
ence grounded in metaphysical concepts could
5“So muß man der Musik den Vorzug zugestehn, ihrem
ganzen Wesen nach idealisch zu seyn. Sie reinigt die
Leidenschaften gleichsam von dem materiellen ihnen
anhängenden Schmutz, indem sie selbige ohne Bezug auf
Gegenstände bloß nach ihrer Form in unserm inner Sinn
darstellt.” August Wilhelm Schlegel, Vorlesungen über
schöne Litteratur und Kunst (1801−02), ed. Ernst Behler
(Paderborn: Schöningh, 1989), I, 375.
6“Wir können sie nicht als Bestandtheile der Körperwelt gel-
ten lassen, für welche das Gesicht und der Betastungssinn
zeugt. Die Töne sind insofern etwas Unkörperliches, ob sie
gleich durch gewegte Körper entstehen; mit dem Geistigen
haben wie wenigstens das Unsichtbare gemein.” Christian
Friedrich Michaelis, “Ein Versuch, des innere Wesen der
Tonkunst zu entwickeln,” Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung
9, no. 43 (23 July 1806): 674 (emphasis added).
7Ferruccio Busoni, “Die Melodie der Zukunft,” Zeitschrift
für Musik (February 1930): 94.
8George Berkeley, Siris: A Chain of Philosophical Reflexions
and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar-Water (London:
C. Hitch and C. Davis, 1744), § 311.
9Peter Sloterdijk, Philosophical Temperaments: From
Plato to Foucault (New York: Columbia University Press,
2013), 67.
10Thomas Carlyle, On Heroes, Hero-Worship, and the
Heroic in History (London: James Fraser, 1841), 1.
11“Ein Klang entsteht, wenn ein elastischer Körper gleich-
zeitige und hörbare Schwigungen macht. . . . Ton nennt
man einem Klang, bey dem man nur auf seine Höhe oder
Tiefe, i.e. auf die mehrere oder mindere Geschwindigkeit
der Schwingungen, Rücksicht nimmt.” Ernst Florens
Friedrich Chladni, Entdeckungen über die Theorie des





be true. And it explains why Schelling would
define a philosophy of nature as nothing less than
the “physical explanation of idealism” itself.12
The articles in this issue set out from this con-
text. They first arose from a conference at
CRASSH (Centre for Research in the Arts,
Social Sciences and Humanities) in Cambridge,
supported by the European Research Council,
that sought to enlarge substantially our under-
standing of the dialogue between nineteenth-
century music and natural science, examining
in particular how a scientific-materialist concep-
tion of sound was formed alongside a dominant
culture of Romantic idealism. My hope is that
they can begin to fill in a set of residual gaps—
exemplified here by Carl Stumpf’s praxis as a
violinist (Julia Kursell), playful extrapolations of
dance music’s numerical undergirding (Nikita
Braguinski), philosophical traumas over what
the “real” matter of sound might be (David
Trippett), and musical mimicry of medical
diagnoses (Peter Pesic)—in musicology’s recent
turn toward the history of science.
Seen in the round, these articles—like pointil-
list spots—are individual but perhaps not isolated.
They hint at a more seismic turn underway, one
that investigates the view that sound, alongside
what Dahlhaus once called the “metaphysical
excesses” of Wackenroder’s generation,13 was
also regarded by writers, composers, scientists,
and engineers as tangible, material, and subject
to physical laws; that scientific thinking was not
anathema but—at key moments—intrinsic to
music aesthetics and criticism; that philosophies
of mind and theories of the creative process also
drewonmechanical rules of causality and associa-
tive “laws”; and that the technological innova-
tions brought about by scientific research were
accompanied by new concepts and new ways of
listening that had a significant impact on the
sound world of composers, critics, and
performers.
12F.W. J. Schelling, SämmtlicheWerke, ed. K. F. A. Schelling,
14 vols. (Stuttgart: Cotta, 1856−61), IV, 76.
13Carl Dahlhaus, The Idea of Absolute Music, trans. Roger
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ABIGAIL FINE: Beethoven’s Mask and the Physiognomy of Late Style
JANET SCHMALFELDT: FromLiterary Fiction toMusic: Schumann and
the Unreliable Narrative
MARCUS R. PYLE: The Rhetoric of Seduction; or Materiality under
Erasure
Corrigendum
In our Summer issue (43/1, 2019), there was an error in the article by Daniel Melamed. The caption for
Example 1 (printed on p. 13) reads: Bach, Cöthen FuneralMusic, BWV 244/49. The caption should read:
Bach, St. Matthew Passion, BWV 244/49.
We regret the error.
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